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ABSTRACT 
The fixed and mobile contents ecosystem has been recently facing a major change 
because the importance of contents business is emphasized by the rapid spread of 
smart media equipments and the accompanying deregulation of related industries 
leads to more intense competition. With the appearance of gigantic platform operators 
or network operators, market concentration takes place. Competitions between 
platform operators and network operators result in unfair trades, which harm both fair 
competition and user’s benefit. Therefore, this paper examines the change of 
distribution structure within evolved contents ecosystem, understands the causes that 
harms fair competition, and offers the ex-post regulation policy that will mitigate 
detected problems. This paper thoroughly analyzes the cases where contents providers 
experienced unfair trading practices in Korea. However, we propose implications that 
would establish an effective set of regulations with minimum government control 
because a unilateral government regulation would harm the development and natural 
revolution. This research focuses on 1) actual conditions and categories of unfair 
trade practice in content ecosystem, 2) current polices and the problems of unfair 
trade practice, and 3) solutions of adopting possible polices that promote fair 
competition practice in content ecosystem. For this purpose, this study carries out 
panel studies of related researchers, policy makers, and industry practitioners in 
Korea. 
1. INTRODUCTION
In smart media environment, users could select digital content based on their 
preferences. Once the content has been selected, users could easily use this content 
through their different types of media. This means that users could seamlessly use 
their selected content through multi-screens. For this reason, securing rich content is a 
core strategy for winning and succeeding in the competitive landscape. Particularly, 
due to the evolutionary integration of individual networks such as telecommunication, 
broadcasting, and internet, operators can provide more versatile and multimedia 
contents as well as applications so that the content industry has the bright prospect.   
Since the domestic digital content market has been forced to change due to the 
mobile open market and rapidly growing smart media industry, recently the open 
application market has made a huge difference in domestic digital content distribution 
and profit structure. As a result, the relationship between content developers and 
platform providers has been changed rapidly. Due to the fact that, at least content 
distribution in mobile ecosystem becomes quite clearer than before. However, things 
are different in internet portals in Korea since market is concentrated on the one or 
two companies. Although Korea government makes a political effort to vitalize 
contents industry since the importance of the industry has been stood out, it is 
indicated that domestic contents industry has some problem in its ecosystem. 
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For this reason, it is time for analyzing how this change has influenced on the 
relationship between content developers and platform providers and whether this 
change has brought to enhance users’ choice within digital content market. Many 
researchers focused on the mobile business model in the ecology since a smartphone 
is appeared and vitalized. Hazlett(2009) and Lin and Ye(2009) analyzed a food web 
in the smartphone industry but they only focused on the business aspect. Furthermore, 
a study on regulation scheme for unfair practices in the contents distribution has not 
been activated. Clemons and Madhani(2010) suggested that new digital business 
models, such as Google, would require new regulatory regimes. However the research 
dealt with sponsored search case but contents distribution. Mehra(2011) investigated 
the differences between the concept of walled garden and open platforms, and the 
paper analyzed Government ‘s roll for the recent internet ecology. The author argued 
that some framework for guidance is still needed to yield significant social returns. A 
wide range of studies has covered antitrust law and regulation, however, those papers 
touched on mainly platform providers’ market power in the internet industry. This 
paper focuses on the content distribution structure in the internet and content 
ecosystem, and attempts to find possible policies that may prevent adverse effects of 
unfair trade practice and foster fair competition practice in content ecosystem. Unless 
the proper profit sharing of contents production takes place, it can be an obstacle to 
progress contents industry. It is because the unfair environment may demotivate 
active contents production or disable developers to raise production funds. Likewise, 
it is also advised to establish ex-post regulation regimes by examining unfair practices 
between providers and contents developers under the current content ecosystem. 
 
Therefore, this study analyzes content ecosystem in Korea under fixed and mobile 
contents market environment and comprehends the types of unfair practices through 
case studies. It enables us to forecast possible unfair practices as well as to provide 
policy proposals, which can be adopted as holistic ex-post regulations. To find out 
possible policies that may prevent adverse effects of unfair trade practice and foster 
fair competition practice in content ecosystem, this research focuses on 1) actual 
conditions and categories of unfair trade practice in content ecosystem, 2) current 
polices and the problems of unfair trade practice, and 3) solutions of adopting 
possible polices that promote fair competition practice in content ecosystem. For this 
purpose, this study carries out panel studies of related researchers, policy makers, and 
industry practitioners in Korea. 
 
 
2. CONTENTS ECOSYSTEM IN KOREA 
 
(1) APP-MARKET ECOSYSTEM IN KOREA 
 
The number of Smartphone and wireless Internet users worldwide substantially 
increased. Moreover, the use of mobile contents is also growing as Smart-pad/table 
PC such as iPad is expected to continue to rapidly propagate. The content 
environment has been transformed from closed market to open market by the 
development and distribution of various contents and the appearance of App markets. 
The App store of Apple and the Android market of Google take the lead in this 
market. The sales of these global application markets have doubled since 2011. Their 
sales show an upward trend as the sales of Apple’s App store grow. The key players 
in the mobile contents ecosystem prior to a Smartphone are contents provider (CP), 
contents aggregator (CA), mobile portal operator, and network operator. Contents 
providers that are linked to distribution industry and mobile portal operators are 
compulsory to trade mobile contents. A contents aggregator collects contents from 
multiple providers and plays a role to distribute a mobile portal operator. A mobile 
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portal operator provides subscribers with a variety of information-entertainment 
service as well as contents via wireless communication. 
 
Table 1. Changes of Mobile contents distribution environment 
 
Before smart phone era After smart phone era
Wireless internet open issue Enhancement of mobile contentscompetitiveness
Players
Developers, Contents
Aggregaters, Mobile portal
providers, Network operators
App content developers, Platform
providers, Users, Network
operators
Structure Vertical Relationship centralizednetwork operators
Horizental Relationship among
developers, platform providers and
network operators
Environment
changes
▶
Key point
  
 
 
Lower the Entry barrier for application market
Developers
Software/
Content Providers
Personal Developers
Mobile
App. Market
Device Manufacturers
OS Vender
Operators
Portal Providers
Etc.
Users
Smart Phone/Pad
Featured Phone
Etc.
Expanding Application Variety based on incentives for 
individual developers
Providing
Profit
Sharing
3G/4G
Wifi
PC Sync
 
Figure 1 A structure of mobile open market 
 
 
In the case of Korea, beside from Apple and Google’s global markets, application 
markets are centered around mobile carriers. These application markets are being part 
of Google’s Android market as a form of shop-in-shop. Although, each market is 
indirectly affected by the Google Android OS policy, it is actually run by its mobile 
carrier under their own separate policy. On the other hand, Samsung Electronics and 
LG Electronics, the companies that make Smartphones, also run their own market 
places. In the case of domestic open market, although it has been rapidly growing, the 
size of market is relatively small comparing to the global open market. Therefore, it is 
difficult for contents business to make profits. Especially, customer pays an 
insignificant amount of money on mobile contents, as there is a great deal of free 
contents. Therefore, it is demanding for them to reach break-even unless they have 
highly competitive contents. Recently, global mobile carriers including SK Telelcom 
and KT offer their customers WAC(Wholesale Applications Community), the open 
platform in which applications are provided to customers who have subscribed their 
tele-communication service. Moreover, K-APPS, the WAC2.0 standard Korean 
Intregrated App Store, began to service as of November 1, 2011. NHN, the major 
domestic internet portal firm, also recently opened N store, the NHN’s open market. 
Naver open market is operated as a part of Google Play for a while and considered to 
be loaded in a cell phone like T-store and Olleh market. 
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Meanwhile, the market has been changing in ways that customers can be provided 
with contents or applications from any web site, regardless of OS and cell phone, as 
the mobile Internet standard has changed to web standard. Nowadays, full browsing 
became possible and the use of mobile Internet increased with the appearance of 
HTML 5, the new web document standard, and Mobile OK, the mobile web standard. 
According to the Korea Communications Commission (KCC)’s research on 
Smartphone usage pattern in the first half of 2012, most of users use mobile web 
(48.6%) when they access to Internet through the Smartphone. Therefore, KCC 
expects that the use and role of mobile web will be increased (KCC, 2012) With the 
spread of the mobile web standard, major domestic and global portals offer mobile-
only web site through which the user can access to full browsing, thus expanding the 
use of fixed-mobile interlocking contents. In the case of global platform providers, 
Google (Search, Gmail, Calendar, and so forth) and Yahoo (Mail, Messenger, Flicker, 
News, Weather, Finance, Sports, Entertainment, and so forth) run their mobile portal. 
In Korea, Daum (Mail, Search, News, Stock, T-story, and so forth), SK 
Communications (Mini-cyworld, Music, Vedio, and so forth), and Naver (Mail, Café, 
Blog, News, and so forth) run their mobile portal. Internet portal providers offer 
contents reprocessed for being suitable to mobile portal and make an effort on finding 
a new revenue model such as mobile advertising. In other words, the C(Contents)-
P(Platform)-N(Network)-T(Terminal) type of the traditional value chain collapsed 
while a new ecosystem in which various contents or applications are retained and 
distributed has been established based on open platform with the cooperation of 
developer, cellphone manufacturer, and mobile carrier. 
 
Cell phone manufacturers and mobile carriers without mobile platform either 
construct their exclusive application market place or make an alliance with an 
existing application market place to enter an ecosystem since it is particularly difficult 
for them to enter the ecosystem. As a result of this phenomenon, App-Economy was 
coined. (KT Economy and Management Research Lab, 2011) The platform-centered 
ecosystem is recently expanding to areas apart from mobile phones, such as TV (e.g., 
Samsung’s Smart TV app store), and PC (e.g., Apple’s Mac app store), thereby 
strengthening the importance and role of platform operator. 
 
Table2. Current state of mobile App-market   
 Platform Company Market 
Number 
of 
Apps 
(‘12.4) 
Time to 
commercializatio
n 
Profit 
sharing 
Global 
iOS Apple App Store 600,000 2008.7 3:7 
Android Google Google Play 500,000 2008.10 3:7 
Third party 
Android 
Amazon Amazon AppStore 34,000 2011.3  
GetJar GetJar 35,000 2004  
Window7 MS Windows Marketplace 83,000 2009.10 3:7 
Symbian Nokia Ovi Store 70,000 2009.5  
Blackberry RIM App Worle 70,000 2009.4 2:8 
Etc. 
AT&T, 
NTTDOCOMO
, Verizone 
WAC -   
Domestic 
(Korea) 
 
 
Window7, 
Android SKT T Store 190,000 2009.9 3:7 
Window7, 
Android KT 
Olleh 
Market 550,000 2009.10 3:7 
Android LG U+ Oz store 7,000 2010.8 3:7 
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Bada Samsung Samsung Apps - 2009.2 3:7 
United 
Platform 
SKT,KT,LG 
U+ KWAC - 2011.11  
iOS, 
Android NHN N Store  2012. 6  
 
 
 
(2) PROFIT SHARING BETWEEN MOBILE CARRIER AND CONTENT 
PROVIDER 
 
In 2000, at the early stage of Internet introduction, profit sharing ratio between a 
mobile carrier and a CP on content usage fee was basically 1:9. However, profit 
sharing ratio has been affected by the joint investment and increased investment on 
systems resulted from various factors including the improvement on cell phones, the 
development of related technologies, and the diversification of offered contents. At 
this point in time, profit sharing ratio between an app market operator and a CP is 
almost fixed as 3:7. It is partially affected by the policies of Apple, as their app store 
is globally popular. In the case of app market environment, profit sharing calculation 
and standard practices of transaction become transparent. As a result, one-man 
developer or small CPs can take a benefit from the transparent calculation, thus 
significantly reducing unfair trading practices. 
 
However, in the case of Korea, besides the fixed profit sharing ratio between a CP 
and an app market operator through the app market, there are other cases where a 
mobile carrier and a CP trade contents. In these cases, based on contents genres or 
contract methods, trades are executed at various profit sharing ratios under the name 
of content usage fee. According to KCC, the profit of CPs was decreased from 
509.283 billion won in 2006 to 432.973 billion won in 2008. It is due to the fact that 
not only did the market for content usage fee decrease, but also the weight of CP’s 
profit decreased. (Kweon, Sul. and Lee, 2011)   
 
Basically, profit sharing ratio between a mobile carrier and a CP is decided based 
on overall assessment of mobile carrier’s facility type and range, marketing support 
range, third party intervention on calculation, and so forth. At the early stage of 
mobile contents business, each mobile carrier used contents distribution as a new 
profit model, and minimized CP’s profit to maximize theirs. Therefore, mobile 
carriers engaged in unfair practices against medium-sized CPs to make more profits, 
thus causing a vicious circle where a CP cannot make a profit in a mobile carrier-
centered contents ecosystem. In terms of digital music, a reasonable standard of profit 
is not shared with a copyright holder. These kinds of unfair practices are known as a 
harming factor to the advance of music contents industry. 
 
KCC introduced profit sharing guideline as of June 2009, and defined unfair 
practices of profit sharing between a mobile carrier and a CP as a prohibited act under 
Telecommunication Business Act. As a result, profit sharing between a mobile carrier 
and a CP has improved to some extent. However, due to the appearance of the open 
ecosystem and various environmental changes in the contents market, unfair practices 
in the mobile contents or application ecosystem began to appear in various forms. In 
other words, when platform operators who run app markets discriminate registration 
of application developers by abusing their market dominance, if customers wish to 
cancel a purchase of any application, application developers have to compensate for 
the entire commission, as platform operators claim that they are not responsible for 
any cancelation fees. Additionally, it is claimed that the current profit sharing ratio of 
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3:7 is unfair as the importance of developers stands out, thereby increasing their 
bargaining power. In this regard, besides from the monolithic ratio of 3:7, there are 
some cases where developers are guaranteed with additional profits. For example, in 
the case of Google’s Chrome Web Store, 95 percent of application sales margin is 
distributed to developers. It is also known that BuleVia of Telefonica proposes 50 
percent of profits from advertising and 10 percent of profits from SMS in addition to 
sales margin.  
 
(3) CONTENT MARKET OF INTERNET PORTAL IN KOREA 
 
The digital and communications convergence era is where a platform shares 
contents and users. Various Internet portals perform the role of platform in the 
Internet environment. The word Portal conceptually originated from Latin word porta, 
which means a gate, signifies a first gateway to the Internet in the Internet 
environment. Internet portal is defined as a system with a search engine that 
efficiently connects users to any useful site from a starting point on the web. (Clarke 
Ⅲ and Flaherty, 2003; Ledbetter, 1999) 
 
On the other hand, the concept of portal has gradually broadened as the importance 
of Internet stands out. Users access useful information, form community, use e-
commerce, and are provided with efficient contents or services through the Internet 
portal. (Trombly, 2001) However, portal operators who run Internet portals tend not 
to “share” contents and users, but to “rule” them. Some portal operations in Korea 
gain a powerful social influence as well as a dominant trading position as economic 
power is centered and monopolized in the hands of them. A big portal sometimes 
signs an unfair contract with a CP by abusing their dominance position, as it can be a 
great channel in which contents produced by the CP are distributed, 
 
When we closely examine the entire contents market in Korea, even though the 
recent use of mobile Internet contents has radically increased, the fixed Internet 
contents market is still relatively larger than wireless Internet contents market; the 
annual value of the domestic sales of Internet contents is 3.2185 trillion won, made up 
of 0.3792 trillion won (11.8%) in wireless contents sales and 2.9393 trillion won 
(88.2%) in fixed Internet contents sales. It is because multiple contents such as E-
learning, game, and music are still serviced through the fixed Internet. Contents 
developers provide users with contents via various general or professional portal sites.  
However, in terms of the number of contents developers, the total number of CP in 
Korea is estimated as 5,724, made up of 4,804 (83.9%) and 920 (16.1%) of mobile 
and fixed business unit, respectively. The number of CP in the mobile business unit is 
much greater mainly because of the tendency of CP in the fixed business unit being 
gigantism.   
 
Table3. Internet Content Revenue in Korea (’11.12), (Unit : 100M Won) 
 
Mobile Internet Contents Fixed Internet Contents 
Total Mobile open  
market 
Mobile 
closed 
market 
Sum Fixed Internet Portal 
Revenue 1,062 2,730 3,792 (11.8%) 
28.393 
(88.2%) 32,185 
 
※ Source: KCC statistics (2012.8) 
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   Table4. Number of Internet Content Providers (’11.12), (Unit : 100M Won) 
 
Mobile Internet Contents Fixed Internet Contents 
Total 
Mobile open  
market 
Mobile 
closed 
market 
Sum Fixed Internet Portal 
Number 
of CPs 3,373 1,431 
4,804 
(83.9%) 
920 
(16.1%) 5,724 
※ Because most CPs develop both fixed contents and mobile contents, the numbers are duplicated  
※ Source: KCC statistics (2012.8) 
 
In case of wireless Internet contents, one-man developers or small-sized CPs can 
enter the market as long as they have competitive elements. However, in case of fixed 
Internet contents, each CP has to enter the market by directly trading with a portal or 
with a master-CP who is a middle distributor. In this process, unfair practices of a 
master-CP or portal prohibit a CP from entering the market or running a business. As 
a result, small-sized CPs hardly survive in the fixed contents market and the market is 
being centered around large CPs with bargaining power.  
 
Game,
Music,
Cartoon,
Video,
Applications,
Etc.
Content
Aggregator
/Master CP
Internet Portal
User
App Market
Provider
Internet Portal
Mobile Open Market
Content
Production Distribution Consumption
 
Figure 2. Contents distribution system 
 
 
(4) THE PROFIT SHARING OF THE INTERNET CONTENT MARKET 
IN KOREA 
 
The problems of Korea Internet contents market can be summarized as follows. 
First, as numerous medium- or small-sized CPs deal with a small number of large 
platform operators, those large platform operators are likely to abuse their dominance 
position in the monopolistic trading structure. The abuse of large platform operators 
appears in unfair practices such as unfairly low profit sharing to medium- or small 
sized CPs, unilateral ownership of contents copyright, and contents registration 
refusal without well-grounded reasons. Second, the terms and conditions for use 
applied to contents trading between platform operators and CPs are not appropriate 
for characteristics of each content genre and the terms and conditions for use that 
does not include necessary contents, such as matters of notification, defect 
indemnification, and payment, damages CPs as well as users. 
 
Furthermore, besides from making a direct contract with CPs, Internet portal 
operators in Korea contents market contract with middle distributors by bundling 
contents based on genre. Therefore, it is important to note the trading state of a MCP 
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and an individual CP. An individual CP or a developer makes a direct contract not 
only with a portal, but also with a MCP to supply contents to a portal. In case of 
digital sound, contents are distributed in a form of Application Service Provider(ASP) 
service. In this case, it can be problematic that, except for a few portal operators, most 
of MCP provides CPs related to their company with favorable contract conditions to 
discriminate other CPs during contents distribution.   
 
Internet portal has a different profit sharing method by genre, which is different 
from that of mobile app-market. The profit of a portal, which provides online service, 
is composed by 50%~60% of net gain from online game, 30%~35% of net gain from 
online music, 50% of net gain from online movie, and 10%~50% of net gain from 
online soap opera. However, the profit ratio of an online game developer, an online 
music contents supplier, an online music supplier, a copyright owner and supplier of 
online soap opera are 40%~50%, 10%~15% or 20~30%, around 20%, 45%~80%, 
respectably. It is possible that unfair practices regarding content supply rules, 
commission, or profit sharing can take place in trading between a large portal and a 
medium- or small-sized CP.  
 
There are various forms of contractual relationship between a portal operator and a 
CP on the use of contents. For example, a portal directly sells supplied contents and 
shares profits proportional to the number of uses with a CP. Or, a CP directly supplies 
contents to the users by directly using a portal’s platform, and pays network fees to 
the portal. Or, a portal outsources contents with their own budget, and supplies them 
to users. A portal also tends to put a lower price on the contents supplied by a CP than 
on the contents supplied by themselves or a subsidiary company. In some cases, large 
Internet portals beforehand deduct 5~10% of contents payment from the CP’s profits 
at the distribution of content usage profit. This kind of prior deduction is obviously 
the abuse of a portal’s dominance position against CPs who are under the inferior 
position. Therefore, it is required to impose an appropriate sanction to control unfair 
practices. 
 
 
3. THE ANALYSIS OF UNFAIR PRACTICES IN THE FIXED AND 
MOBILE CONTENTS ECOSYSTEM 
 
Operators, who produce and run fixed and mobile platforms, attempt to build their 
own ecosystem as well as to expand vertically and horizontally in the same or 
different line of business. Mobile carriers or platform operators who gain 
competitiveness in this process intentionally or accidentally commit unfair practices. 
It is known that mobile carriers, large manufacturers, and platform operators with 
market dominance conduct these unfair practices in the structure of the fixed and 
mobile ecosystem. This study analyzes the types of unfair practices in the fixed and 
mobile contents ecosystem and we interview professional panels to provide the most 
appropriate methods. Professional interviewees include related business operators, 
scholars, and regulators. 
 
 
THE CASES AND TYPES OF UNFAIR PRACTICES 
 
A. The discrimination of platform operators against contents providers. 
 
Platform operators discriminate contents providers by asking either considerably 
favorable or unfavorable contract conditions at the platform service trade. For 
example, when a portal operator makes an alliance contract with their subsidiaries or 
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non-subsidiaries to obtain contents, the operator discriminates non-subsidiaries by 
favorably assigning free inventory advertisement only to its subsidiaries. 
 
B. The abuse of market dominant position. 
 
Platform operators force CPs to provide unfair profits and to do compulsory buying 
by abusing their dominant position at the Internet contents trading. The majority cases 
of unfair practices are as a result of this market dominant position abuse and the cases 
are as follows. 
∙ A mobile carrier imposes excessive payment commission to a CP in the contents 
contract, thus giving a disadvantage to them. 
∙ A platform operator bans UCC suppliers from playing prior advertisements, 
which is suppliers’ main profit source, thus putting them in a financially 
hazardous condition.  
∙ A platform operator asks a CP to freely share a source code and operation 
manual of an application belonged to the CP, thereby taking improper profits. 
∙ A platform operator forces a CP or related companies to buy Internet 
advertisement, or forcibly sets a sales goal. 
 
C. The limited or refusal of profit sharing. 
 
Platform operators limit or refuse profit sharing with a CP as follows; A platform 
operator unfairly imposes a sales commission to a CP; A platform operator 
unilaterally decides the contents price; A portal gets sales commission out of Internet 
shopping malls by using their monopolistic strength at online distribution; A platform 
operator makes a contact of contents distribution at an extremely low price, or does 
not share proper profits to a CP.  
∙ A portal asks Internet shopping mall to pay 30% of commission as a brokerage 
charge when the mall sells cell phones via a portal’s shopping mall. 
∙ A portal buys contents, such as news, at a giveaway price under the name of 
contents distribution 
∙ A portal does not disclose the complete contents sales information to CPs. 
Therefore, CPs cannot confirm whether they got paid an appropriate amount of 
contents sales profit. 
Last but not least, professional panels also pointed out that platform operators 
could refuse to provide service to CPs. Thus, we categorize a portal operator’ unfair 
practices against CPs into four types in the table below. 
 
Table5. The Type of Unfair Practices between a Platform Operator and CP 
 
The type of unfair 
practices Contents 
Discrimination 
The discrimination against a competitor CP by making 
a favorable contract with subsidiaries or specific 
contents suppliers.  
Abuse its monopoly 
position 
The coercion to sign an unfair contract or to disturb a 
contractor's normal business activities. 
Unfair profit sharing The refusal or restrictions fair profit sharing. 
Unfair refusal The refusal or restrictions providing platform service. 
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4. EX-POST REGULATION OF THE UNFAIR CONTENTS 
DISTRIBUTION IN KOREA 
 
If each element of ecosystem voluntarily maintains the fair competition order, 
government regulation will be unnecessary. If not, however, the regulatory agency 
must suppress monopolization in the market economy, and regulate restriction on 
competition or unfair practices to establish the fair competition order. Fair 
competition is the competition where every business operator within workable 
competition seeks to create a win-win outcome by competition. There is a list of 
requirements that need to be met in order to properly implement the fair competition.  
The first, Free competition. In order to ensure free competition, the entry to and exit 
from the market should be easy and competition between operators within the market 
should not be disturbed. The second, The fairness of Competition Methods. Namely, 
free competition has to be orderly implemented by such competition methods as price, 
quality, service, and so forth. The third, Transaction with free will. The parties to a 
transaction should be given the freedom of participation in a transaction, of choice in 
accounts, and of terms of business set-up. Any transaction cannot take place without 
the free will of both parties.  
 
That is to say, in order to ensure the fair competition in the contents ecosystem, 
regulators must establish a minimum but effective set of regulations to promote an 
environment where fair competition can flourish in the fixed and mobile contents 
ecosystem. As a result, the competitiveness of firms will be improved and customer 
protection and welfare as well as industry and national development will be enabled. 
If the government too much intervenes the market, it will put the market into 
confusion, and likely shrink the industry. Therefore, a minimum set of regulations is 
necessary. Ex-post regulations will be more appropriate than ex-ante regulations, and 
be offered as a form of a business guideline for business operators to voluntarily 
follow the regulations.   
 
The first, it is advised to impose a duty of prior information disclosure on the basis 
of open consultation between a platform operatior and a CP. That is, (1) profit sharing 
is decided by the agreement of two parties and both parties should obligatorily share 
the rational argument on the demand level such as profit sharing ratio. (2) In profit 
calculation, a portal should obligatorily provide a CP with necessary information such 
as a gross profit and a statement of accounts.   
 
The second, Internet content-related parties should concretely propose the detailed 
types of unfair practices regarding prohibited acts so that a fair trade environment in 
the market or the distribution order can be established. We can segment the most 
problematic unfair practices in Korea into six cases based on the four types above. ① 
Unfairly low profit sharing of contents sales to a CP. (Type3), ② The unfair 
ownership of contents copyright. (Type2), ③ The disturbance on a CP’s business. 
(Type2), ④ The pressure on unfair profit offering such as advertisement purchase. 
(Type2), ⑤ The discrimination on subsidiaries by offering a relatively favorable 
contract. (Type1), ⑥ The refusal of contents registration without just reasons. 
(Type4) Some cases are already legally included in the prohibited acts in the content 
trading via mobile platform. However fixed platform operators, Internet portal 
providers, are not included in the prohibited acts in Korea. Therefore, it is advised 
that law revision is immediately required to expand the prohibited acts in the fixed 
Internet as well.  
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The third, in order to improve the effectiveness of guideline, it is recommended to 
form a private organization which coordinate and consult self-imposed control on the 
guideline. Regulators should only be involved to advice recommendation of 
correction on the unsettled issues. The consultative group should be composed of 
fixed and mobile platform operators, the representative of a CP, scholars, and 
government regulators. Moreover, they should monitor whether guidelines are well 
followed, and carry out self-regulating mediation or adjustment. This is to build a 
healthy content ecosystem by market autonomy while minimizing government 
regulation. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper examines the change in the distribution structure in a contents 
ecosystem during the rapid growth of the fixed and mobile contents industry. The 
rapid growth of market was driven by the deregulation in related industries. Moreover, 
the market was highly concentrated by a few platform operators with market 
dominance in an ecosystem. As a result of this phenomenon, unfair practices that 
harm fair competition and user profits in fixed and mobile contents market were 
reported, thereby also negatively affecting on the healthy contents ecosystem. 
Therefore, this paper focuses on the contents ecosystem in Korea, and examines the 
types of unfair practices that CPs experienced by analyzing actual cases. On the other 
hand, we propose the minimum government regulation because a unilateral regulation 
can hamper the development and natural evolution of a contents ecosystem. We also 
discuss how members in the ecosystem can voluntarily settle conflicts to reach a win-
win solution. 
 
However, the ex-post regulations we propose in this paper still have practical 
limitations. Domestic platform operators are competing against global platform 
operators, such as Apple and Google. Therefore, it can be proposed that domestic ex-
post regulation is reverse discrimination against domestic platform operators, if it is 
applied only to them, because those global platform operators have stronger market 
dominance. Therefore, policy makers and regulators should consider the needs as well 
as the practicality of extraterritorial application of domestic regulation. It is 
recommended to discuss remedies across country because the problems that those 
global platform operators cause can happen to any country. 
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